diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Mailman/SecurityManager.py')
| -rw-r--r-- | Mailman/SecurityManager.py | 75 |
1 files changed, 40 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/Mailman/SecurityManager.py b/Mailman/SecurityManager.py index af8e6b07..62360feb 100644 --- a/Mailman/SecurityManager.py +++ b/Mailman/SecurityManager.py @@ -67,6 +67,12 @@ from Mailman import Utils from Mailman import Errors from Mailman.Logging.Syslog import syslog +try: + True, False +except NameError: + True = 1 + False = 0 + class SecurityManager: @@ -143,15 +149,15 @@ class SecurityManager: try: salt = secret[:2] if crypt and crypt.crypt(response, salt) == secret: - return 1 - return 0 + return True + return False except TypeError: # BAW: Hard to say why we can get a TypeError here. # SF bug report #585776 says crypt.crypt() can raise # this if salt contains null bytes, although I don't # know how that can happen (perhaps if a MM2.0 list # with USE_CRYPT = 0 has been updated? Doubtful. - return 0 + return False # The password for the list admin and list moderator are not # kept as plain text, but instead as an sha hexdigest. The # response being passed in is plain text, so we need to @@ -163,20 +169,18 @@ class SecurityManager: if secret is None: continue sharesponse = sha.new(response).hexdigest() - upgrade = ok = 0 + upgrade = ok = False if sharesponse == secret: - ok = 1 + ok = True elif md5.new(response).digest() == secret: - ok = 1 - upgrade = 1 + ok = upgrade = True elif cryptmatchp(response, secret): - ok = 1 - upgrade = 1 + ok = upgrade = True if upgrade: - save_and_unlock = 0 + save_and_unlock = False if not self.Locked(): self.Lock() - save_and_unlock = 1 + save_and_unlock = True try: self.password = sharesponse if save_and_unlock: @@ -192,8 +196,12 @@ class SecurityManager: if secret and sha.new(response).hexdigest() == secret: return ac elif ac == mm_cfg.AuthUser: - if self.authenticateMember(user, response): - return ac + if user is not None: + try: + if self.authenticateMember(user, response): + return ac + except Errors.NotAMemberError: + pass else: # What is this context??? syslog('error', 'Bad authcontext: %s', ac) @@ -205,22 +213,19 @@ class SecurityManager: # contains a matching authorization, falling back to checking whether # the response matches one of the passwords. authcontexts must be a # sequence, and if it contains the context AuthUser, then the user - # argument must not be None. + # argument should not be None. # # Returns a flag indicating whether authentication succeeded or not. - try: - for ac in authcontexts: - ok = self.CheckCookie(ac, user) - if ok: - return 1 - # Check passwords - ac = self.Authenticate(authcontexts, response, user) - if ac: - print self.MakeCookie(ac, user) - return 1 - except Errors.NotAMemberError: - pass - return 0 + for ac in authcontexts: + ok = self.CheckCookie(ac, user) + if ok: + return True + # Check passwords + ac = self.Authenticate(authcontexts, response, user) + if ac: + print self.MakeCookie(ac, user) + return True + return False def MakeCookie(self, authcontext, user=None): key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(authcontext, user) @@ -269,7 +274,7 @@ class SecurityManager: # authentication. cookiedata = os.environ.get('HTTP_COOKIE') if not cookiedata: - return 0 + return False # We can't use the Cookie module here because it isn't liberal in what # it accepts. Feed it a MM2.0 cookie along with a MM2.1 cookie and # you get a CookieError. :(. All we care about is accessing the @@ -294,8 +299,8 @@ class SecurityManager: for user in [Utils.UnobscureEmail(u) for u in usernames]: ok = self.__checkone(c, authcontext, user) if ok: - return 1 - return 0 + return True + return False else: return self.__checkone(c, authcontext, user) @@ -304,7 +309,7 @@ class SecurityManager: # combination. key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(authcontext, user) if not c.has_key(key) or not isinstance(secret, StringType): - return 0 + return False # Undo the encoding we performed in MakeCookie() above. BAW: I # believe this is safe from exploit because marshal can't be forced to # load recursive data structures, and it can't be forced to execute @@ -318,18 +323,18 @@ class SecurityManager: data = marshal.loads(binascii.unhexlify(c[key])) issued, received_mac = data except (EOFError, ValueError, TypeError, KeyError): - return 0 + return False # Make sure the issued timestamp makes sense now = time.time() if now < issued: - return 0 + return False # Calculate what the mac ought to be based on the cookie's timestamp # and the shared secret. mac = sha.new(secret + `issued`).hexdigest() if mac <> received_mac: - return 0 + return False # Authenticated! - return 1 + return True |