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| author | tkikuchi <> | 2005-02-10 03:57:00 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | tkikuchi <> | 2005-02-10 03:57:00 +0000 |
| commit | 84166df3718461e420b7d672df91bfd271814a03 (patch) | |
| tree | 4ab948e2f7ef439a5698beb830cd54d30999bb87 /Mailman/Cgi | |
| parent | 558a5b013874b17380d93f0501a5b5a56c945e77 (diff) | |
| download | mailman2-84166df3718461e420b7d672df91bfd271814a03.tar.gz mailman2-84166df3718461e420b7d672df91bfd271814a03.tar.xz mailman2-84166df3718461e420b7d672df91bfd271814a03.zip | |
Checkin for initial workaround for directry traverse flaw in private.py.
This is for the people who think 'CVS should be safe' and not final solution.
Diffstat (limited to 'Mailman/Cgi')
| -rw-r--r-- | Mailman/Cgi/private.py | 9 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/Mailman/Cgi/private.py b/Mailman/Cgi/private.py index 5fa5398e..cacc79cd 100644 --- a/Mailman/Cgi/private.py +++ b/Mailman/Cgi/private.py @@ -35,13 +35,16 @@ from Mailman.Logging.Syslog import syslog _ = i18n._ i18n.set_language(mm_cfg.DEFAULT_SERVER_LANGUAGE) +SLASH = '/' + def true_path(path): "Ensure that the path is safe by removing .." - path = path.replace('../', '') - path = path.replace('./', '') - return path[1:] + # Workaround for path traverse vulnerablity. Unsuccessfull attempt + # will be logged in logs/error, anyway. + parts = [x for x in path.split(SLASH) if x not in ('.', '..')] + return SLASH.join(parts)[1:] |